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JURISDICTION BY IMPLIED
CONSENT
JANE MARY O'MELIA*

T

HE theory of jurisdiction of the state over a person by the doing
of an act within the state by a non-resident captivates interest, because of the possibility it seems to hold for the remedy of an evil,
namely, the difficulty of reaching a non-resident who has committed a
wrong within the state, and who has departed from the state before
process can be served.
Ordinarily adherence to precedent is, of course, a sound policy, but
strict adherence in deciding cases and formulating rules of law is not
always possible, nor, in fact, desirable.' Law ought keep pace with the
change in conditions in society, 2 the philosophies of men and the progress of civilization. Throughout our legal history we find, embodied in
our law, the principle that laws can be adapted to changing conditions.
And the courts, through their decisions, indicate that this flexibility is
an important feature of the system. While departures from the spirit
and letter of the Constitution cannot command respect or approval,
application of established principles to new situations makes our law
3
a real, vital institution.
"The exercise of jurisdiction by a state through its courts over an
individual may be based upon any of the following circumstances:
a. The individual is personally present within the state
b. He has his domicil within the state
c. He is a citizen or subject owing allegiance to the nation
d. He has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction
e. He has by acts done by him within the state subjected himself to
' 4
its jurisdiction.
* B.A., University of Wisconsin; J.D., Marquette University; Member of Wis-

consin Bar.
' Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pit. 1 (U.S.) (1842) overruled by Erie Railroad v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) ; Grovey v. Townsend, 295
U.S. 45, 55 S.Ct. 622, 79 L.Ed. 1292 (1935) overruled by Smith v. Allwright,
64 Sup. Ct. 757, 321 U.S. 649, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944), which upheld the right of
2 negroes to vote in the Texas primary to nominate candidates for Congress.
Hollen v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 18 S.Ct. 383, 42 L.Ed. 780 (1898).
8 "While the meaning of the Constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of
their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation." Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).
4 Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, by the American Law Institute,
Sec. 77 (1934).
Authority for the bases there enumerated are:
(a) Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 Atl. 714 (1895); Hart v. Granger, 1
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The discussion here is confined to subdivision (e) above, that is, the
power of a court to render an inpersonam judgment against- a nonresident who has done an act within the state, by virtue of which he
has given his implied consent that an agent be served with process for
a cause of action arising out of that act.5
Referring briefly to the development of the implied consent theory,
we find it arose in cases involving corporations.
Foreign corporations engaged in interstate commerce are distinguished from those doing intrastate business, by virtue of Article 1,
Section 8 of the Federal Constitution, which provides that "Congress
shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several states, and with the Indian tribes." Therefore, a state may
not impose any restriction or regulation upon such corporations which
will burden or interfere with interstate commerce, and, consequently,
may not require the designation of an agent within the state upon whom
service of process may be made. However, if a corporation, engaged in
interstate commerce, is doing business within a state, service of process
may be made upon an agent conducting the business, in pursuance of a
state statute providing for service upon that agent. In International
HarvesterCompany v. Kentucky G the court held that such a corporation
is not immune to process, and service upon an agent of the corporation
is valid, even though the corporation is engaged solely in interstate commerce.
As to intrastate business, a state may constitutionally prohibit a foreign corporation from coming into the state to do that business, inasmuch as a corporation is not a citizen under the Privileges and Immunities clause of the Constitution.7 Having the power to refuse to allow
the corporation to enter, it also has the power to impose reasonable requirements upon corporations seeking admission, including the giving
Con. 154 (1814); Grover & Baker S. Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S.

287, 11 S.Ct. 92, 34 L.Ed. 670 (1890).

(b) Sturgis v. Fay, 16 Ind. 429 (1861) ; Bickerdike v. Allen, 157 Ill. 95, 41 N.E.
740 (1895); Henderson v. Staniford, 105 Mass 504 (1870); Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940).
(c) Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 52 S.Ct. 252, 76 L.Ed. 375 (1932).
(d) The consent here considered is actual assent, expressed in words or shown
by conduct.
Chandler v. Hardeman, 12 Ala. App. 572, 68 So. 525 (1915) ; Ellis v. Gordon, 202 Wis. 134, 231 N.W. 585 (1930); Hazel v. Jacobs, 78 N.J.L. 459,
75 Atl. 903 (1910) ; Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
(e) Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927) ; Henry
L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 55 S.Ct. 553, 79 L.Ed. 1097

5 29

(1935).

KEN.

L. J. 344 (1941).

6 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 34 S.Ct. 944, 58 L.Ed.

1479 (1914).
7 Federal Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 2. "The Citizens of each State shall be

entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 168 (1868); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239,
19 S.Ct. 165, 43 L.Ed. 422 (1898).
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of consent to service of process upon an agent, designated by the corporation, or upon the secretary of state.8 By doing acts within the state,
the corporation confers upon the state jurisdiction to entertain suits
arising from those acts. 9
If a foreign corporation comes into the state and there engages in
business without taking out a license, as required by statute, and without designating an agent upon whom service of process may be made,
as to causes of action arising out of the business within the state, still
valid service.may be made upon the secretary of state or some other
statutory agent. In the case of Old Wayne Mutual Life Association of
Indianapolis v. McConough'0 the court said, "It is true that, if an insurance corporation of another state transacts business in Pennsylvania
without complying with its provisions, it will be deemed to have assented to any valid terms prescribed by that commonwealth as a condition
of its right to do business there; and it will be estopped to say that it
had not done what it should have done in order that it might lawfully
enter that commonwealth and there exert its corporate powers.-By
going into Pennsylvania without first complying with its statute, the
defendant association may be held to have assented to the service upon
the insurance commissioner of process in a suit brought against it there
in respect of business transacted by it in that commonwealth." The state
having the power to exclude the corporation entirely, it may deem the
doing of an act implied consent to substituted service.
Coming now to the individual non-resident, ordinarily a state may
not require an individual entering the state to appoint an agent to receive process, as a condition of admission, in view of the Privileges and
Immunities clause, which guarantees a citizen of one state free egress
and ingress as to other states. Notwithstanding, it has been held that
in come cases, under the police power, a state may constitutionally regulate acts of a non-resident within a state, and as a means to this regulation, may enact a statute which provides that the doing of an act within the state confers an implied consent by the non-resident that service
of process, for a cause of action arising out of that act, may be served
upon the secretary of state, as agent of the non-resident.",
When automobiles came into general use and travel from one state
to another became very common, it was inevitable that the motorist
should become involved in collisions in foreign states. Personal service
of process upon these tortfeasors was impractical because they often
8 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 (1855) ; Penn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold
Issue Co., 243 U.S. 93, 37 S.Ct. 344, 61 L.Ed. 610 (1917) ; State of Washington
v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361, 53 S.Ct. 624, 77 LEd. 1256 (1933).
9
Truck Parts Inc. v. Briggs Co., (D.Ct. D. Minn.), 25 Fed. Sup. 602 (1938).
10 Old Wayne Mutual Life Asso. of Indianapolis v. McConough, 204 U.S. 8, 27

S.Ct. 236, 51 L.Ed. 345 (1907).

"Restatement

of the Law of Conflict of Laws, Sec. 84, 85.
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left the state following the accident and failed to return. To remedy
this situation, states passed the so-called "non-resident motorist" statutes, providing for substituted service upon an agent (secretary of state
or some other governmental officer) under the theory that the automobile operator, by driving his car within the state impliedly consented
to the state's jurisdiction over him.
12
The first case involving such a statute was Kane v. New Jersey.
Here the court sustained the statute which provided that a non-resident
operator of an automobile should, before operating his car on the highways of the state, expressly appoint the secretary of state as his agent
upon whom process might be served in any action arising out of the
operation of the automobile within the state.
Then came the decision of Hess v. Pawloski,1 3 upholding a state
statute of Massachusetts which provided that the operation by a nonresident of a motor vehicle upon a public highway of the commonwealth
should be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such non-resident of
the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to be his agent upon whom process
might be served in any action against him growing out of any accident
or collision in which the non-resident might be involved while operating
the automobile on such a public highway, and that the operation should
be a signification of his agreement that any such process against him
should be of the same legal force as if served on him personally. A
state has the power to forbid a non-resident to do acts within the state
involving danger to life or property, unless he first consents to the exercise of jurisdiction of the courts of the state as to causes of action arising out of those acts. In this celebrated case the court said, "This statute is plainly enacted in the exercise of the police power. It is designed
to afford protection to the personal safety of travelers on the highways
of our commonwealth. Its purpose is to promote the public safety and
to converse the public health. These ends are universally recognized as
appropriate objects for the exercise of the police power. Specifically,
the aim of the statute is to facilitate the enforcement of civil remedies
by those injured in their person or property by the negligent and wanton operation of motor vehicle upon the highways of this commonwealth."
Now many states have similar statutes. They have been upheld,
where some adequate provision is made for notice to the non-resident
4
defendant.'
New Jersey,
L. REv. 563 (1926).

12Kane v.

242 U.S.

160, 37 S.Ct. 30, 61 L.Ed. 222 (1916). 39 HARV.

13 274 U.S. 352 (1927), Supra.
14 Martin v. Condon, 3 N.J. Misc. R. 726, 129 Atl. 738 (1925) ; Schilling v. Odlebak, 177 Minn. 90, 224 N.W. 694 (1929); Jones v. Paxton, 27 Fed. 2nd 364
(1928) (D.Ct. D. Minn.), Wis. STAT. 85.05 (1927) ; State ex rel Cronkhite v.
Belden, 193 Wis. 145, 211 N.W. 916 (1927); State ex rel Stevens v. Grimm,
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Under the police power, states have seen fit to enact laws concerning service of process in cases arising out of the sale of securities.' 5
In Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman'6 the question of.jurisdiction arose when Goodman sought a personal judgment for damages
arising out of a sale contract for securities. Pursuant to an Iowa statute,'7 service was made in Iowa upon an agent of Doherty, a resident
of New York. The court sustained the statute and in the opinion quoted
with approval the language of the Iowa Supreme Court in Davidson v.
H. L. Doherty & Co.' 8 involving the same statute, to the effect that the
wording of the statute places residents and non-residents of the state
upon he same footing, so there is no abridgment of the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several states. The United States Supreme
Court then referred to the non-resident motorist cases, in which cases
the power of the states to impose terms upon non-residents, as to activi•ties within their borders, was approved; and concluded by saying that
so far as Doherty was affected, the statute went no farther than the
principle approved by those opinions permit.' 9
It may be assumed from the tenor of this opinion that if the wording of the statute had not been guarded as it was ("in any county other
than that in which the principal resides") the outcome probably would
have been the same, rested squarely upon the power of the state to
completely regulate the sale of securities.
The theory of implied consent has been applied to the sale of securities by a non-resident in Wisconsin, by the adoption of Sec. 189.27,
Wisconsin Statutes, (1941) which reads as follows:
Service on non-residents. In any action or proceeding in this
state, arising out of or founded upon any misrepresentation or
fraud or any violation of this chapter or of any order, rule or
regulation of the department in which any issuer, dealer or other
person, who shall have appointed the director and the deputy di192 Wis. 601, 213 N.W. 475 (1927); State ex rel Ledin v. Davison, 216 Wis.
216, 256 N.W. 718 (1934); State ex rel Nelson v. Grimm, 219 Wis. 630, 263
N.W. 583 (1935) ; Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 259, 72 L.Ed. 446
(1928) ; Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 53 S.Ct. 599, 77 L.Ed. 1158 (1933) ; 20
IowA

L.

REv.

15 WIs. STATS.

Texas).

654 (1935).

189.04 (1931) ; Thomas v. Atkins, 52 Fed. Sup. 405 (1943) (N.D.

"6Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 218 Iowa 529, 255 N.W. 667 (1934); 294
17

U.S. 623 (1935).
Sec. 11079 Iowa Code, 1927. "When a corporation, company or individual has,
for the transaction of any business, an office or agency in any county other than

that in which the principal resides, service may be made on any agent or clerk
employed in such office or agency, in all actions growing out of or connected
with the business of that office or agency."
isDavidson v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa 739, 241 N.W. 700 (1932).
19 In Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), Supra, that principle was framed in
the following words, "The measure in question operates to require a nonresident to answer for his conduct in the state where arise causes of action
alleged against him, as well as to provide for a claimant a convenient method
by which he may sue to enforce his rights."
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rector, and each of them, its attorneys, shall be a party, service of
any summons, complaint, pleading, process, order or notice may
be made by service upon either such attorneys or by filing a copy
of same with the department. The department shall forthwith
forward by mail, postage prepaid, to the person designated in the
appointment at the address stated therein, or if no such designation has been made, to the issuer, dealer or other person at his
last known post-office address, a copy of such papers. Thereupon,
service of such papers upon such issuer, dealer or other person
shall be deemed complete personal service. The certification of
the department under its official seal, of such service, shall be
sufficient proof thereof."
Under this statute, an effective means has been provided to reach
non-residents who perpetrate fraud in the sale of securities, whether
they have designated an agent to receive service or not. This tends to
strengthen the belief that the states can and will continue to apply the
implied consent theory of jurisdiction as against individuals.
Although implied consent is the basis by which jurisdiction is conferred upon courts by foreign corporations engaged in intrastate business, and by individuals in the non-resident motorist and securities
cases, it will be noted that the fundamental idea underlying the basis
is different. In the corporation cases it arises because the state has the
power to exclude corporations entirely ;20 and in the individual nonresident cases, it is because of the police power, the power of a state to
adopt measures which tend to protect the public, through their effect
upon the non-resident, the theory being that a statute which subjects
him to suit within the state will make him more cautious. The result is
that the health and safety and general welfare of the residents are protected.
Now that the theory of implied consent, as a basis of jurisdiction
in inpersonam actions, has been accepted, founded as it is on the police
power, the query arises, "May it not be extended? May not a state enact
a statute, or statutes, which will provide that a non-resident who comes
into the state and engages in an activity, or commits an act, which militates against the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the residents, impliedly consents to the service of process upon the secretary
of state, as his agent?"
True, this theory would immediately be branded by some as an unwarranted and unconstitutional deprivation of personal rights. However, many would see that it has considerable merit, and can be constitutionally upheld, upon the principle affirmed in the motorist and security cases.
20

19 IOWA L. REv. 421 (1934).
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In approaching the problem, proper emphasis must be placed upon
the importance and potential strength of the police power, which the
states did not surrender when the Constitution was adopted. That police power is the inherent and plenary power in the state which enables
it to prohibit all things harmful to the comfort and welfare of society
and to require all things which promote the health, safety, morals and
general welfare of its citizens.
In the first instance, the decision as to whether or not a certain measure is within the police power of a state rests with the legislature and
is presumed to be lawful. It may be declared unlawful by the courts
only when it is clearly arbitrary, unnecessary, or violative of some constitutional right. Excerpts taken from judicial opinions serve to impress
this; and serve to convince us that the exercise of police power remains
unhampered by precedent:
"The (state's police) power is not circumscribed by precedents
arising out of past conditions, but is elastic and capable of expansion in order to keep pace with human progress."' 1
"A large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine not only what the interests of public convenience and
welfare require,
but what measures are necessary to secure such
22
interest."
"There must be some reasonable basis for legislative activity in
respect to the matter dealt with, else the subject is outside the
scope of legislative interference. However, given a subject in respect of which there is some reasonable necessity for regulation,
fair doubt in respect thereto being resolved in favor of the
affirmative, in case of the legislature having so determined, the
degree of exigency is a matter wholly for its cognizance. What
is said as regards legitimacy of subjects for the exercise of the
police power may be repeated as to appropriateness of means;
while given the two elements-legitimacy of subject and appropriateness of means-the degree of interference within the
boundaries of reason is for the legislature to decide, there being
left in the end the judicial power to determine whether the interference goes so far as to violate some guaranteed right-regulate it so severely as to materially impair it, reasonable
doubts
23
being resolved in favor of legislative discretion."
The need for the exercise of the police power in the instances here
contemplated is a present one, and the need in the near future in all
probability will be much greater. The ease and speed with which a person may now travel by auto from one state to another, of course, is
known to all. In addition, on every side we see and hear forecasts of
the future; a future which promises, for example, to an average man
City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
22 Cotter v. Stoeckel, 97 Conn. 239, 116 At. 248 (1922).
23 Mehlos v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146 N.W. 882 (1914).
21
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of an eastern city a few hour's trip by plane to Wisconsin or some other
middlewest state; a weekend in the south; a week's vacation in California. A knowledge of human nature and past experiences carries the
almost certain prediction that in the wake of this unprecedented ease
and speed of travel will come breaches of personal and property rights
by men in states far from the residences of those travelers. This generally contemplated increased use of air travel, accessible to an everincreasing proportion of the population brings the realization that the
problem of service of process will probably be aggravated to such an
extent that some means must be provided to protect the welfare of persons in the state, injured by non-residents, without forcing the plaintiffs to go thousands of miles to seek restitution.
This behooves us now to consider the problems that not only exist
today, but those that will confront us later. To seek to develop a method
whereby valid service may be made on non-residents who do acts within
the state, injurious to others, and leave before process can be served
seemed a worthy pursuit.
The justification for using the police power to provide a method of
substituted process is the likelihood that a state with a statute authorizing service upon an agent, impliedly appointed by the doing of an act
within the state, provides protection for people in the state, whether
residents or non-residents, 24 in that the law will have a tendency to promote safety to persons, property and finances, because non-residents
will be more apt to act carefully, to avoid torts, if they know that mere
escape over the state line, and failure to return to the state of the act,
will not envelop them in a cloak of immunity from process within the
state.
Other reasons also exist. The person wronged naturally desires some
method of bringing the defendant back to the state for trial because
suit there is more convenient for the plaintiff and his witnesses. Certainly, it is less expensive for the plaintiff to have the matter litigated
where the cause of action arose than in the place where the defendant
resides or is found. Then too, the tort is governed by the law of the
25
state where the act was committed.
Concededly, before the enactment of any measure under the police
power, there must be a need for it. What proportions that need must
24

State ex rel Rush v. Circuit Court, 209 Wis. 246, 244 N.W. 766 (1932). Non-

resident motorist statutes apply to non-resident plaintiffs as well as to resident.
Suit in Wisconsin under such a statute, by a resident of Illinois against another
resident of Illinois was sustained. Accordingly, non-resident claimants undoubtedly could avail themselves of other implied consent statutes.
25 Western Union Telephone Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 34 S.Ct. 955, 58 L.Ed.
1457 (1914); Slater v. Mexican Nat. R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 24 S.Ct. 581, 48
L.Ed. 900 (1903) ; Mike v. Lian, 322 Pa. 353, 185 At]. 775 (1936) ; Le Forest v.
Tolman, 117 Mass. 109 (1875); Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933), Supra.
Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, Sec. 378-379.
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assume before a remedy is forthcoming cannot be definitely determined.
Is it to be determined solely by the number of persons who can use it?
Or, is the determination also to take into consideration the severity of
the injury to the plaintiff and the consequent effect on the public? Many
believe that the latter ought be considered, as well as the former.
The means of accomplishing the desired end would be the passage
of legislation, and it is submitted that a statute providing for service
upon non-residents, through an agent within the state (secretary of
state or other statutory agent), based upon implied consent through the
doing of an act, would be constitutional, just as are the non-resident
motorist and security statutes.
The extension of the implied consent theory to fields now partially
regulated, under the police power, may be the method by which regulation is made more complete.
Consider, for instance, the licensing of employment agents, covered
by Chapter 105 of the Wisconsin Statutes. Any person, firm, corporation or association which furnishes to persons seeking employment information enabling or tending to enable such persons to secure the same
must take out a license. This license may be revoked by the Industrial
Commission upon certain grounds. Is that adequate protection for the
seekers of work? Will that keep potential racketeers out of the state?
Would it not be better to have a statute which provided that anyone
who engaged in this activity, with or without a license, impliedly consented to service upon the secretary of state, in causes of action arising
out of that activity ?
Now the need may not be impelling, but consider the situation that
may confront us in a period of reallocation of labor, or of unemployment. Ought not some means of protecting workers be now considered,
some means which will tend to make employment agents more cautious?
The unemployed will undoubtedly flock to employment agencies and pay
the fees required. Then they may find that the unscrupulous agent has
defrauded them and left the state. If that agent is a resident of the state,
he may be reached on the basis of his domicil, but if he is a non-resident
the seekers of employment would have to undergo suit in a distant state
to recover.
Persons acting as collection agents must also secure a license, under
Sec. 218.04 of the Wisconsin Statutes, which provision was enacted under the police power. If a non-resident comes into the state and unlawfully engages in this business without securing a license, defrauds the
public, and then departs, the innocent victims cannot reach him except
in a foreign state. And, if he does secure a license, the only remedy
against him is through foreign suit. The state can revoke his license and
impose a small fine or imprisonment. This does not offer much restitu-
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tion to those injured. If this agent knew he must return here to defend
himself in an action arising out of his acts, or suffer a default judgment
being entered against him, it is submitted that he would be less inclined
to attempt to carry on his illicit trade.
In the field of foods and drugs, extensive legislation has been enacted in an attempt to protect the health of the public. Requirements
are laid down for their production, preparation or manufacture, and
also licenses are required for the sale of some foods and drugs, and
there are prohibitions against the sale of any adulterated foods and
drugs. The penalties for noncompliance include fine and/or small terms
of imprisonment. But here too there is a conspicuous absence of any
provision which will enable one injured by purchase and consumption
of such foods and drugs to reach a non-resident seller. A person living
in the state, or a non-resident coming into the state who causes residents to suffer injuries to their health often flee the state to try to
escape suit. Would not the health of the state be better protected by an
implied consent statute ?26
In the statutes regulating the sale of real estate, we find that a license must be secured 27 and that a non-resident of the state may become
a broker or salesman, but that he must file an irrevocable consent to
service of process upon the Real Estate Board in causes of action arising in this state. No provision is made for service if the broker or salesman does not file this consent. If a non-resident comes in, and sells
real estate fraudulently without applying for a license and without consenting to service upon an agent, and then departs from the state, the
question arises as to wether or not the state really is adequately protecting the welfare of its citizens.
Inasmuch as licenses are required, and machinery has been set up
to eliminate as much as possible fraud and misrepresentation, does it
not seem logical to conclude that the regulation would be more complete and effective if no loophole were left, through which a defrauder
might escape? The effective plug for this hole would be the enactment
of an implied consent statute, similar to the one now in force in regard
to the sale of securities.
A perusal of the laws of any state reveals that in many other instances licenses are required of persons who wish to engage in an activity which is related to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of
26 There have been numerous cases involving injuries to health because of the

sale or service of impure or adulterated foods and drugs. Bishop v Weber, 139
Mass 411, 1 N.E. 154 (1885); Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121,
52 S.E. 152 (1905); Peckham v. Holman, 28 Mass. 484 (11 Pick.) (1831);
Askam v. Platt, 85 Conn. 448, 83 Ati. 529 (1912); Malone v. Jones, 91 Kan.
815, 139 Pac. 387 (1914); Green v. Wilson, 194 Ark. 165, 105 S.W. (2d) 1074
(1937) 4 A.L.R. 1559; 47 A.L.R. 148; 105 A.L.R. 1039; 5 A.L.R. 1115; 35 A.L.R.
911; 50 A.L.R. 231; 98 A.L.R. 687; 104 A.L.R. 1033.
27 Chapter 136, Wis. STATS.
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the public. To make regulation complete, in fields generally agreed to
be within the province of the police power, the enactment of statutes,
upon the theory of implied consent, through the doing of an act, in all
probability would further the protection of the public and inure to the
benefit of the state, as well as to individuals within it.
Consideration and thought might well be given now to the extension of the theory to cover non-resident aviators. "The law of the subject (aviation) under discussion is as yet inits infancy. it is, of course,
the proper function of the legislative department of the government, in
the exercise of the police power, to consider the problems and risks that
arise from the use of aircraft and to endeavor to adjust private rights
and harmonize conflicting interests by comprehensive statutes for the
' 28
public welfare.
Damage to person and property through the more common use of
airplanes will inevitably increase. The following cases illustrate instances where damage has actually resulted, and perhaps serve as indicator of the type of lawsuits that will follow in the wake of expanded
air travel.
The aviator who ran into a tower, in attempting to make a landing
was held in an action in trespass. 29 The defendant who used plaintiff's
private property as a place to park his plane was successfully proceeded
against in an action in trespass.30 In an action against the owner and
pilot of an airplane, by the owner of a house, for damages thereto from
the crashing of the plane on the roof of the house, there was a verdict
against the defendants. 31 A pilot whose plane, while he was taxiing
down the runway of an airport, collided with a standing truck, which he
could have seen in time had he looked carefully, was held guilty of contributory negligence. 32 Cranking a plane with no one in it, in violation
of a statute or ordinance, resulting in its running across a landing field
and crashing into other planes, has been held to constitute negligence
per se.33
If the pilots involved in the above cases, and scores of others similar, were non-residents, who left the state before service of process
could be made upon them, the innocent plaintiffs would be forced to
forego suit here, and would have to seek out the defendants elsewhere.
To adopt a "non-resident aviators statute" upon the same general
pattern of the "non-resident motorist statute" certainly would help safeguard persons and property in the state.
28 6 AMERIcAN JURISPRUDENcE 3.
29 Smith

v. New England Aircraft Company, 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
Rochester Gas and E. Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N.Y.S. 469 (1933).
30 Anderton v. Watkins, 122 Me. 346, 120 At. 175 (1923).
31 Kirschner v. Jones, N.J.L. (1932), U.S. Av. R. 278.
32 Read v. N. Y. Airport, 145 Misc. 294, 259 N.Y.S. 245 (1932).
33 T. A. T. Flying Service v. Adamson, 47 Ga. App. 108, 169 S.E. 851 (1933).
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Further extension of the theory is conceivable. If, in the future,
people do move from one state to another more frequently, more speedily, and more promiscuously, lawmakers may come to the decision that
persons in one state must be protected from isolated acts of torts by
non-residents; and that a method of suing these non-residents in the
state where the cause of action arose will tend to provide that protection. The principle of the non-resident motorist cases (that a statute of
substituted service will further the safety and welfare of residents by
making non-residents more careful of their acts within the state) may
then be applied in cases of all torts.
Pertinent Constitutional provisions must be considered in connection with the theory. The Privileges and Immunities clause 34 does allow
free egress and ingress to citizens of one state as to all other states.
However, there is no requirement that the regulations affecting residents and non-residents need be identical,3 5 and a state may provide a
mode of service for non-residents different from that which applies to
residents.3 6 Constitutional privileges and immunities of a non-resident
are not denied, for example, by a Minnesota statute3 7 which provides
"When a cause of action has arisen outside of this state, and, by the
laws of the place where it arose, an action thereon is there barred by
lapse of time, no such action shall be maintained in this state unless the
plaintiff be a citizen of the state who has owned the cause of action
ever since it accrued, where the foreign limitation, though shorter than
38
that of Minnesota, is not unduly short."
A state may require a non-resident, although a citizen of another
state, to give bond for costs, even though such bond is not required of a
resident.39 Regulation of the internal affairs of a state cannot reasonably be characterized as hostile to the fundamental rights of citizens of
40
other states.
Therefore, while a state cannot forbid citizens of other states from
entering it, the conclusion seems reasonable that a state may require a
non-resident to give implied consent to be served with process through
a statutory agent, in causes of action arising from his acts within the
state-and be sustained under the Privileges and Immunities clause.
The statute could be framed to obviate criticism under that clause.
One possibility is that the form follow that of Iowa 41 considered in the
34 Federal Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 2.
35 Canadian Northern R.R. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S.Ct. 402, 64 L.Ed. 713
(1920).
36 Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 27 S.Ct. 261, 51 L.Ed. 461 (1907).
37 Minn. Gen. Statute, Sec. 7709 (1913).
38 Canadian Northern R.R. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920) Supra.
39 Ownby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 41 S.Ct. 433, 65 L.Ed. 837 (1921).
40 Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898) Supra; Chalker v. Birmingham &
N. W. R.R. 249 U.S. 522, 39 S.Ct. 366, 63 L.Ed. 748 (1919).
41 Section 11079 (Iowa).
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Doherty case. If it applied to all non-residents of the county (or other
political subdivision), residents of the state, living outside the county
in which the cause arose, and non-residents of the state would be treated
alike.
Or, it could be so framed that it embraced non-resident citizens as
well as non-citizens. Citizenship and residence in a state are not necessarily synonymous.42 In Douglasv. New York, 43 a state statute was upheld which made it discretionary with the courts to entertain an action
by a non-resident of the state against a foreign corporation, since the
statute was applicable alike to non-resident citizens, and non-resident
non-citizens. Similar construction and interpretation would no doubt be
applied to a process statute following the plan used in the Douglas case.
The Equal Protection Clause44 requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and condition, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.4 5 Laws need not affect every
man, woman and child exactly alike in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality." Equal protection in its guaranty of like
treatment to all similarly situated permits classification 7 which is reasonable and not arbitrary 48 and which is based upon substantial differences, having a reasonable relation to the objects or persons dealt with
and the public purpose sought to be achieved by the legislation involved.4 9 The Equal Protection clause does not forbid discrimination
with respect to things that are different. 50
Hostile discrimination certainly is not the aim and purpose of a
statute seeking to make non-residents amenable to local process. Rather,
it seems, as do the non-resident motorist statutes, to put all upon the
same footing.5 '
42

Travis v. Yale Mfg., 252 U.S. 60, 40 S.Ct. 228, 64 L.Ed 460 (1920).
Douglas v. New York, 279 U.S. 377, 49 S.Ct. 355, 73 L.Ed. 747 (1929).
44Federal Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 1. "Nor (shall any state) deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
45 Hartford S. B. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459, 57 S.Ct. 838, 81 L.Ed. 1223
(1937).; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 56 S.Ct. 252, 80 L.Ed. 299 (1935).
40 Sammarco v. Boysa, 193 Wis. 642, 215 N.W. 446 (1927).
47 District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 29 S.Ct. 650, 53 L.Ed. 941 (1909);
43

Thompson v. Kentucky, 209 U.S. 340, 28 S.Ct. 533, 52 L.Ed. 822 (1908); St.

John v. New York, 201 U.S. 633, 26 S.Ct. 554, 50 L.Ed. 896 (1906) ; Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911);
Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 30 S.Ct. 287, 54 L.Ed. 536 (1910).
48 Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52 S.Ct. 581, 76'L.Ed. 1167 (1932) ; Alward v.
Johnson, 282 U.S. 509, 51 S.Ct. 273, 75 L.Ed. 496 (1931); Dohany v. Rogers,
281 U.S. 362, 50 S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904 (1930).

49 Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 28 S.Ct. 28, 52 L.Ed. 108
50 1907).
Puget Sound Power and L. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 54 S.Ct. 542, 78 L.Ed.
1025 (1934).
51 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) Supra "Literal and precise equality in
respect of this matter is not attainable, it is not required."
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Residents can be reached by substituted service 52 even though they
be out of the state, and provision for substituted service upon nonresidents brings the two classes of defendants upon a more equal plane.
Due Process, under the 14th Amendment 53 requires that notice and
an opportunity to be heard be given a defendant.
The requirement of notice to the defendant is adequately provided
for in the non-resident motorist statutes, and similarly must be and
can be required in a statute involving implied consent. Service of process upon the state official and mailing a copy to the non-resident at his
place of residence constitute due process of law and support a personal
judgment in favor of the person injured. 54 The statute would have to
be strictly followed, inasmuch as the right of substituted service is
statutory and is strictly enforced. 5 The method used for giving notice
must be reasonably calculated to reach the defendant. If a return receipt were demanded there could be little doubt that the defendant had
received the required notice. 56 The time within which to appear or answer ought be long enough to enable defendants to protect their rights.
The similarity between the statutes already upheld as constitutional,
providing for reaching non-resident defendants outside the state, and
those here contemplated gives rise to the belief that the latter too would
be valid.
Time and again courts have held that clauses of the Constitution
have in effect been subjugated to the police power of the states. Statutes, challenged as denials of rights granted under the Constitution,
have been sustained, where it was shown that the measure was necessary for the good of the public. By analogy, then, the conclusion plausibly may be reached that the implied consent statutes can be upheld, as
an exercise of the police power, just as statutes in other fields, passed
in the exercise of that power, have been. A reference to some of these
cases is illustratory.
Instances in which a state statute has been upheld against attack as
depriving an individual of the use of his property, in the interest of the
public, include, among others, one giving authority to a board of health
to employ all necessary means to protect the public health, and if neces- Wis. STATS., Sec. 262.08(4).
53 Federal Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 1. "nor shall any State deprive any per-

son of life, liberty or property without due pricess of law."

Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) Supra; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.

352 (1927) Supra; State ex rel Cronkhite v. Belden, 193 Wis. 145, 221 N.W.
.916 (1927) Supra.
5 Pollard v. Wegener, 13 Wis. 569 (1861); Caskey v. Peterson, 220 Wis. 690,

263 N.W. 658 (1936); Maya Corp. v. Smith, 32 Fed. 2nd 350 (1929) (D.Ct. D.
Delaware); Thompson v. Butler, 214 Iowa 1123, 243 N.W. 164 (1932); 20
MINN. L. IEv. 649 (1936).
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sary to destroy private property ;57 quarantine and health laws, authorizing summary destruction of imported cargo and other articles ;58 restriction of the use of natural resources by one class in the interests of
the community. 59 Not only may property be destroyed in the, attempt to
safeguard health, but also to preserve other property. 60
Personal freedom, guaranteed by the Constitution, also is subject to
the police power of a state, when its control is deemed necessary for
the good of many. Compulsory vaccination can be requiredn as well as
sterilization of feebleminded inmates of a state institution.8 2
When the state of Indiana passed a statute 3 which required a person having charge of a jail to receive any prisoner arrested by police
and to detain the suspect until otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction, its validity was sustained under the police power, inasmuch as the public peace, safety and well-being are the very end and
object of free government. So, legislation which is necessary for the
protection and furtherance of this object cannot be defeated on the
ground that it interferes with the rights of some of the people, or even
deprives them of such rights. The court, in Scoopmire v. Taflinger
et a1 4 used language in point with the principle here propounded when
it said, "Both the Federal and State Constitutions are living and growing documents. Within the limits necessary for the preservation of our
form of federal and state governments and the basic principles upon
which they rest, the Constitutions of both State and Nation must be
construed to the end that public progress and development will not be
stifled and that public problems, with their ever increasing complexity,
may be met and solved to the best interests of the public generally. In
these days of hard-surfaced roads and easy means of rapid transportation, the criminal may be, within an hour, seventy-five or eighty miles
from the place where the crime was committed."
So too, in the best interests of the public generally, a private citizen,
wronged by an act of a non-resident who can quickly cross the state
line, and hold himself immune from the process of the state in which
he committed the injury, ought have the benefit of some effective means
to aid him.
Although freedom of speech and religion are also among the inalienable rights preserved to all, and no state may prohibit the free exercise
57Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N.W. 942 (1904); Bittenhause v. Johnston,
92 Wis. 588, 66 N.W. 805 (1896).
58 Lawton v. Steele, 119 N.Y. 226, 152 U.S. 133 (1894); Health Dept. v. Rector,
145 N.Y. 32, 39 N.E. 833 (1895).
59 Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 41 S.Ct. 118, 65 L.Ed. 276 (1920).
60 Williams v. State, 176 S.W. (2d) 177 (1943) (Texas); Miller v. Schoene, 276

U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246, 72 L.Ed. 568 (1928).

Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643 (1905).
62 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 47 S.Ct. 584, 71 L.Ed. 1000 (1927).
63Burns Ann. Stat., Sec. 47-831, 47-832.
64 Scoopmire v. Taflinger et al, 52 N.E. (2d) 728 (1944) (Indiana).
61
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of religion and freedom to communicate information and opinion, 65
this personal right does not prevent the state from regulating the hours
during which handbills may be distributed, and meetings held. Nor is
the right of free speech infringed by a statute which requires paid labor
union organizers to register with the secretary of state and secure organizers' cards before soliciting members within the state.""
The Contract Clause6 7 is also subject to the police power of a state,
and may be suspended when necessary. A statute passed in the exercise
of this power will be upheld by the courts although it incidentally destroys existing contract rights such as one which forbids the further
conduct of a lottery, even though a previous contract had been made
permitting it;6s prescribes hours of labor in particular occupations69
prohibits child labor ;"0 forbids night work by women ;7' reduces hours
of labor for women ;72 and prohibits waiver of warranties. 3
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the tenor of decisions and legal reasoning have been that the power preserved to the
states, the police power, may be exercised when necessary, even in the
face of some specific clause in the Constitution. That being true, it seems
logical to conclude that where there is a real need for a statute providing for service of process upon non-residents who have come into a
state and committed an act injurious to property or person therein,
that statute can and will be upheld, notwithstanding the 14th Amendment and certain Articles in the Constitution.
By reliance on the Nebbia Milk case, 74 surely the proposed statute
is justifiable. Neither property rights nor personal rights nor contract
rights are absolute, and equally fundamental with them is the right of
the public to regulate such rights in the common interest. The guaranty
of due process demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, and the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. In effect, the
police power is not a closed category, and the court indicated that as
needs arise and times change, that power will be sufficient to do what
is required to promote general welfare.
The resident of another state who enters our state expects to receive, and does receive protection, be it of our police force, our fire
Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940).
66 Ex Parte Thomas, 174 S.W. (2d) 958 (1943) 141 Tex. 591.
67 U. S. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 10. "No State shall pass any law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts."
68
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 25 L.Ed. 1079 (1880).
69
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 18 S.Ct. 383, 42 L.Ed. 780 (1898).
70 Sturges & B. Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 34 S.Ct. 60, 58 L.Ed. 245
(1913).
71 Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 44 S.Ct. 325, 68 L.Ed. 690 (1924).
72 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 S.Ct. 324, 52 L.Ed. 551 (1908).
73 Advance-Rumley T. Co. v. Jackson, 287 U.S. 283, 53 S.Ct. 133, 77 L.Ed. 306
(1932).
74 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934).
65
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departments, our sanitary regulations, or others. In exchange for that
protection, the state asks that he obey our laws and refrain from any
injury to persons or property. The next step might well follow-the
step that leads to substituted process in case he does an act which in
75
fact injures another.
A state from which a person has departed after committing a crime,
in the hope of escaping apprehension, may depend upon extradition to
have him returned to answer for his deeds- It seems reasonable to
afford a private citizen, a person actually harmed, perhaps by the same
act, a devise whicA will probably induce the defendant to return to
stand trial in a civil suit.
It is inevitable that defendants reached by substituted service will be
inconvenienced by being obliged to suffer a default judgment, or by going into another state to defend the action. However, one readily comes
to the conclusion that a wrongdoer should be required to return to the
state where he perpetrated the wrong, rather than that the innocent
plaintiff seek out the defendant in a distant state. And, if some injustice
should occasionally arise, comfort will be found in the knowledge that
jurists will sustain a rule of law or a statute in the fact of admitted
hardship upon a party when to do otherwise would overrule a principle
76
which should be preserved for the good of many.
To alleviate the difficulties of the non-resident, provisions can and
ought to be made for liberal continuances 77 to enable the defendant to
prepare his defense, and for reopening of default judgments.
Some plaintiffs might be tempted to start a suit against a non-resident when no cause of action exists. However, that too can be foreseen and guarded against. Requiring the plaintiff to file a bond, sufficient to cover the travelling expenses and costs of the defendant in
case the plaintiff is unsuccessful, and the deposit of security by the
plaintiff, as an evidence of good faith and a safeguard against illfounded or malicious suits will usually solve the problem. 78
The extension of the implied consent theory, through the doing of
an act, as a basis of jurisdiction, may be the principle through which
further justice can be secured. Given a need for providing a method of
reaching absent non-residents, a statute authorizing service of process
upon a statutory agent is an appropriate means to fulfil this need. In the
exercise of its police power, a state may enact such a statute, sustainable under the Constitution.
In the Doherty case (supra) that protection was mentioned as one of the reasons why the statute ought be upheld.
76 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303
(1926) (supra) ; In re Emrenecker's Estate, 218 Pa. 369, 67 Atl. 701 (1907);
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 11 S.Ct. 13, 34 L.Ed. 620 (1890).
7 Jones v. Paxton, 27 Fed. (2d) 364 (1928) (D.Ct. D. Minn.).
78 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1929) BK 62A; Mich. Comp. Laws, Sec.
4791 (1929) ; Maine Revised Statutes, Chap. 29, Sec. 131 (1930) ; Ill. Revised
Statutes (Cahill, 1933) C95A, Sec. 21 (1).
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